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International law, human rights and the
transformative occupation of Iraq
PETER G. DANCHIN

Introduction
This chapter examines the project of transformative occupation undertaken by the United States and its allies following the invasion of Iraq
in 2003. More specifically, it considers the US occupation in light of
two competing sensibilities in international legal argument. On one
view, which I term ` legal formalism', the purpose of international law is
eclectic, intersubjective and value-pluralist: to create the conditions for
peaceful coexistence between different political orders and ways of life.
This view is commonly associated with the liberalism of the United
Nations (UN) Charter, i which posits both the subject of international
law and its liberty informal terms as ` the state' and `sovereign equality'
respectively. On a rival view, which I term `instrumental anti-pluralism',
the purpose of international law is to project a universal regime based on
a rationally reconstructed and universally authoritative morality. Here
the identity of the sovereign as a subject of international law is understood in material terms as `the liberal democratic state' and sovereignty
is understood as the equal treatment of legal subjects so defined,
The defining feature of the anti-pluralist view is the notion that the
internal characteristics of a state determine its standing in the family of
nations, Undemocratic, illiberal, or so-called `rogue' states such as Iraq
are not to be regarded as full members of international society and are
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seen to lie outside of the zone of law. Like colonialism by European
nation states during the nineteenth century, the project of military
occupation is intended to transform or civilise the internal identity of
such states in order to bring them into the community of democratic
nations. This is precisely the type of action that legal formalism, with
its underlying rationale of liberal toleration and political inclusion,
had hoped to prevent. As a normative matter, the justification for
transformative occupation is a purportedly universal body of international human-rights norms finding its origin in Enlightenment
notions of individual autonomy and popular sovereignty. t While such
norms lie beyond consent, their legitimacy in practice depends on their
formalism - their acceptability to, and apparent compatibility with,
divergent cultural, religious and ideological ways of life,
In this chapter, I argue that the attempt to transform the Iraqi constitutional structure via military occupation illustrates the complex
dialectic between the formal and instrumental views, a dialectic that
oscillates precariously between imperial imposition in the name of liberal
democracy on the one hand, and a desperate attempt to secure internal
legitimation for the new political order on the other. ' The role of international law in this process is ambiguous and paradoxical. On one hand,
the law assumes an instrumentalist anti-formal guise facilitating the
external project of imposing subjective material norms on a resistant
political order. On the other hand, it provides a formal anti-instrumental
site of deliberation, contestation and struggle critical to the internal
project of the emergence of a distinctly Iraqi constitutionalism. The
contradictions generated by this dialectic allow us to see how international law both constructs and mediates between certain `internal'
and `external' forms of rationality.
One consequence of this dialectic structure is that both sets of actors
invoke both views in their struggle and interaction with each other. They
do so from opposing starting points, before tacitly switching to the view
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adopted initially by their opponent. Thus, the initial positions advocated
by the US as its blueprint for constitutional transformation in Iraq were
premised on notions of `liberal' democracy, `individual' rights, and `free'
markets - strongly instrumentalist values lying beyond the prescriptive
norlnativity of contemporary international law. In response, Iraq invoked
formal norms of sovereignty, self-determination and non-intervention strongly anti-instrumental norms of international law. Facing intensifying
resistance to its project of forced transformation, the US then sought to
engage with Iraqi culture and values by positing formal conceptions of its
objectives. Assertions of liberal rights became claims to human rights;
assertions of liberal democracy became simply daims to democracy.
Conversely, Iraqi political factions now assumed more instrumental and
anti-pluralist positions as they asserted distinctive claims to Islamic democracy, Islamic human rights, and ultimately to Islamic international law.
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the general
features of the rival formal and anti formal guises of international legal
argument. Part II considers how these two sensibilities have shaped
the role and application of occupation law, accupatio be/tic-a, in Iraq.
Part III discusses how the relationship between religion and state has
been contested and understood in the post-2003 constitutional-reform
process. The chapter concludes with observations on the potential of
international law to secure justice and democracy in societies subjected
to `occupation as liberation'.
I. The gift of formalism in international law
The modern structure of international law is liberal, eclectic and intersubjective. The subject of the law is the `state' and the state's liberty is
based on the foundational norm of sovereign equality. The animating
virtues of the modern view are notions of peace, toleration and valuepluralism. These notions are suspended precariously, however, between
two other virtues that international law simultaneously seeks to incorporate and mediate: the seemingly opposing ideas of justice and consent.
On their own, these two virtues appear to threaten the coherence of
international law qua law: justice because it substitutes vague and subjective ideas about international morality for the rules actually obtaining
between states; 6 consent because it identifies international law primarily
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with state will, thus making it external municipal law.' International
law tries valiantly to maintain its autonomy qua law by seeking to
reconcile these seeming opposites within a single form. It does so in
two ways: first, by positing a social ethics (formal positivism) expressing
the freedom of each state as a function of community values and justice; 8
second, by positing an individual morality (humanistic universalism)
which expresses the international community as a function of each state's
unique identity and awareness.` This dialectic structure creates the distinctive double bind of international legal argument.
There are powerful historical reasons for the inherent tension within
each strand of argument. Let us consider, for example, the latter idea of
humanistic universalism. Early modern thought in international law was
premised on a natural morality that asserted a universal law derived from
reason that was applicable to all peoples. When in the late sixteenth
century Francisco de Vitoria wrote about the rights of the Spanish and
the Indians of the Americas, he regarded Indian and Spanish sovereignty
as `coterminous with each other' and the question to be determined `how
God had given possession to the Indians and what conditions the Spanish
must fulfill in order to gain possession rightfully'. 10 Missing from the
logic of Vitoria ' s argument was the modern dialectic of the double bind.
There was no initial assumption of either the Prince's or Indians' sphere
of liberty or `sovereignty' having an independent normative status in the
form of ` statehood'. Rather, sovereignty described the ` powers and liberties which the Prince was endowed with by the nonnative code'. ` Thus,
while international law was universal and the Spanish and the Indians
its subjects alike, the pre-classical jurisprudence of the scholastics was
'
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expressed not as a function of each subject ' s unique identity and awareness, but as a function solely of community values and justice. Being an
exercise in deductive reasoning from a single comprehensive value system, this was necessarily subjective in two senses: first, it was utopian in
the form of European prejudice (the particular masquerading as the
universal). and second, it was apologist in justifying imperial domination
of other cultures.
By contrast, consider the idea of formal positivism. Nineteenth-century
international legal thought was premised on the notion that states, as the
principal subjects of the law, were bound only by those rules to which
they had consented. The long history of European imperialism was
marked, however, by the refusal of European nation-states to recognise
non-European states as having `sovereignty' and thus possessing formal
legal personality under international law. On this view, international
law distinguished between civilised and non-civilised states and applied
only as between the civilised ` Family of Nations ' . I2 The duty of civilised
nations was thus to civilise non-European states - by consent (acquiescence) or, if necessary, by force -- in order to assimilate them into the
nomos of European international law. Missing from this argument was
the modern notion of formal subjecthood - of the `state' as opposed to
the ` civilised state' as the proper subject of international law.
For nineteenth-century positivism the `State - and a set of rights
associated with it - is the professional a priori, the transcendental condition from which discourse proceeds and which itself is not subject to
discussion'. We see this in the writing of nineteenth-century international lawyers, such as James Lorimer and Robert Phillimore, who
both equated Christianity with the highest form of civilisation and who,
as Noyes observes:
placed nations whose views they associated with Christianity in a superior position concerning their international legal rights and obligations
vis-a-vis certain other nations. Their view of the superiority of this
religious system helped them to justify a world in which it was difficult
for non-European States, entities and peoples to be entitled to participate
fully in an international legal community. ' 1
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Both the naturalist universalism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the imperial positivism of the nineteenth century expressed
one-sided unities. They reveal how the non-European periphery could
become included in the European core in not one but two distinct ways:
either by the erasure of the identity of the other in the name of a single
societas humanae, or by forceful embrace such that the identity and
subjectivity of the other would slowly take the form of the European
state, that is as the single representative form of humanity.` In the case
of the former, community was defined according to a one-sided, subjective account of autonomy; in the case of the latter, autonomy was
defined according to a one-sided, subjective account of community; and
in both cases, the process of transformation was unidirectional: the nonEuropean was required to change in accordance with European projections of both the subject and its liberty.
Modern international law seeks to overcome these two pathologies by
describing social life among states in terms of both community and
autonomy and by defining each of these ideals in terms of the other.
This, in turn, generates inherently conflicting demands for freedom and
order. Thus:
In the one case, community is interpreted as negative collectivism and
autonomy (independence, self-determination) is presented as the normative goal. In the other, autonomy is interpreted as negative egoism and
community (integration, solidarity) as what the law should aim at.
Neither community nor autonomy can be exclusive goals. To think of
community as the ultimate goal seems utopian: as there is no agreement
on the character of a desirable community, attempts to impose it seem
like imperialism in disguise. To think of autonomy as the normative aim
seems apologist: it strengthens the absolutist claims of national powerelites and supports their pursuits at international dominance. '

In this way, each strand of argument generates its opposite within itself.
The humanistic universalism of the communitarian argument is limited
by implicit acknowledgement of the boundaries and finitude of deontological reasoning (whether arrived at from notions of God or Natural
Reason) and thus by the unavoidability of pluralism and reasonable
disagreement, The moral notion of universal right is thus premised on
the idea of a social ethics; that is, the claim that all moral norms must
15
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be intersubjectively contested and justified. In this way, communityoriented arguments contain within themselves the normative aims of
self-determination and may be constructed without lapsing into totalitarianism. Conversely, the formal positivism (or legal formalism) of the
autonomy argument is premised on a moral idea: the duty to respect the
autonomy of others as ` reason-giving' and `reason-receiving' subjects.
This idea underlies the universal norm of inclusion and formal status as
a legal subject in the first place. In this way, autonomy-oriented arguments contain within them the normative aims of communal integration
and solidarity and may be constructed without degenerating into unlimited egoism.
The international legal project is driven by this dialectic which creates
a dynamics of contradiction and constant oscillation between patterns of
argument seeking to legitimate social order against individual freedom.
In order to imagine the project as coherent, one first needs to assume
some kind of notion of a ` harmony of interests': the presence or attainability of `an underlying convergence between apparently conflicting
State interests'. `7 In a pluralistic world of different peoples, religions,
cultures, languages, ideologies and ways of life, however, this assumption is questionable. What if, for example, the fundamental interests and
ends of states are inherently incompatible? How is a political community defined by the rule of law premised on some notion of shared
interests and values beyond the state to be imagined or realised in
such circumstances?
A. Formalism and instrumentalism

The traditional response to this dilemma has been to employ the technique of legal formalism. International law is seen to provide the 'flat
substanceless surface" [which] expresses the universalist principle of
inclusion at the outset and makes possible the regulative ideal of a
pluralistic international world'. This is absolutely critical as the form of
the law:
constructs political adversaries as equals, entitled to express their subjectively felt injustices in terms of breaches of the rules of the community
to which they belong no less than their adversaries -- 'thus affirming
both that inclusion and the principle that the conditions applying to
17
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the treatment of any one member of the community must apply to every
other member as well.' s

In any decision to attach meaning to legal norms, sovereign equality
means that states can articulate their interpretations on conditions of
equal standing. They are thus included in the `normative universe as
subjects of rights and duties or carriers of distinct identities ' , It is only
because the regime comprises non-instrumental rules (that is, 'understood to be authoritative independent of particular beliefs or purposes')
that the freedom of its subjects to be different becomes possible. 19 This
has been described as the `gift of forrnalism'. W
On this view, international law is best understood as a project to
reconcile the conflicting claims to freedom of differently situated subjects
and the divergent assertions of right and justice to which they continually
give rise. International law, in other words, is ineliminably intersubjective. If political power is to be employed in the name of some common
social end - say, to protect international peace, or security or justice such that the sovereignty of a particular state is to be limited, then that
power must be exercised according to legal norms and thereby justified
to the state so affected, This remains the case even though states may
differ greatly in their comprehensive views about the good and true
way of life.
This is an attractive picture so far as it goes. The problem is that any
argument for such a formal view is ambiguous. For one thing, no formal
doctrine of sources of law will be able to exclude political considerations, 1' For another, any notion of a ` pure ' or ` complete ' theory of law
is vulnerable to familiar charges levelled against doctrinal utopianism
and its disconnectedness from actual state interests, values and ends. '"
What if, for example, a state asserts that its sovereignty derives not from
some imagined, pre-social liberty but ultimately from God? Or, conversely,
a state asserts that its sovereignty is subject to no external limit other than
that to which it expressly consents?

'e Mid., 102-3.
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These questions compel us to look behind the `formal validity' or
`binding force' of legal norms and to consider the purpose of or reasons
justifying such norms." This generates an `anti-formal' mode of reasoning which defines itself in response to the criticisms of formalism. On this
view, the traditional attributes of sovereignty - political independence,
autonomy, dignity, territorial integrity - are merely legal forms. What
really counts is whether they help or hinder certain (as-yet unspecified)
objectives, values or ends. Do these formal rules, for example, stand in
the way of protecting fundamental norms of democracy and human
rights? Do they shield undemocratic states which lack a system of government based on free periodic elections and are unaccountable to their
citizens? Do they shield illiberal states which fail to offer their citizens
individual rights?
These examples reveal, however, the dangers of instrumentalist
reasoning. If international law is judged in terms of its instrumental
effectiveness, it soon becomes an apology for the (contested) interests
or ends of powerful states. Moreover, by emphasising concreteness the law
risks losing its binding force and normativity altogether. International
law may in this way legitimise force as `enforcement' in a manner that
conflicts directly with the target state's self-understanding. To offset
these dangers, instrumentalist reasoning tacitly resorts to naturalistic
or `objective' ideas of justice. The fundamental norms of democracy
and human rights are not just American or Western but universal values
arrived at by rational consensus and expressing ideals which either
are, or should be, embedded in international law as an expression of
`international right'. A useful articulation of this deep-seated vein of
thought in American historical consciousness is Paine's classic statement that `The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all
mankind'.24
In this way, anti-formalist reasoning returns to the problem it had
sought to overcome as it tacitly invokes the basis on which it first
criticised formalism. There is no escape from the double bind of this
argumentative structure. States are free and unfree at the same time. Like
Odysseus self-bound to the mast of his ship, states are free to find ways
and reasons to live with the Sirens - despite their bad beliefs and the
23
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dangers they pose to civilised seafarers. Conversely, states can break the
double bind in one or both of two ways: by seeking to rule and dominate
the Sirens on the basis of a universal law projected as an object of their
own reflection and intentionality; or by seeking to transform, coerce, or
otherwise civilise the Sirens into becoming members of the existing
community of states.
II, The law of occupatio bellica
Part I has suggested that the structure of international law reflects a
theory of liberal toleration. At issue in the tension and oscillation
between formal and anti-formal modes of reasoning is the scope of
that regime of toleration. In the UN Charter era, the ` flat substanceless
surface' of Art. 2(1) of the Charter has been understood in strongly
pluralistic terms. The sovereign equality of states has extended to republics, centrally planned socialist states, theocracies, kleptocracies, and
modernising post-colonial territories. In more recent times, however,
and especially since the end of the cold war, powerful Western states
and the international institutions they control have advanced antipluralist arguments that seek to give greater moral substance to the
criteria for recognition as independent and equal subjects of international
society. The criteria of inclusion and exclusion turn not on the external
behaviour of states (which would raise familiar issues concerning the
scope of the attributes of sovereignty) but rather on their internal
identity.
The traditional law of belligerent occupation, however, does not allow
for such an ambitious project of constitutional transformation. The
formal rules of international law draw a clear distinction between occupatio bellica and debellatio: the former being a `temporary state of fact
arising when an invader achieves military control of a territory and
administers it on a provisional basis, but has no legal entitlement to
exercise the rights of the absent sovereign'; the latter being:
A legal category describing a condition of `subjugation ' in which the
original sovereign is not merely temporarily incapacitated from exercising his powers due to the presence of the occupying military forces, but is
completely defeated: his institutions of state destroyed, his international
legal personality dissolved. ''`
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Thus, unlike debellatin, nccupatio bellica is a mediating concept, While
recognising the factual reality of an occupying power's military control
of a territory, it imposes an obligation to maintain the continuity of
the juridical and material constitution and to preserve the existing
economic order of the state.
It should be noted, of course, that the notion of belligerent occupation
is somewhat anomalous in the modern era. 26 Articles 2(4) and 51 of the
UN Charter forbid the use of force between states other than in selfdefence against an armed attack. The only other permissible basis for the
occupation of a territory is under Chapter VII's collective security framework. Following the end of the cold war, the UN established transitional
administrations to implement transformational state-building projects
in territories such as Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia. These cases
are not necessarily inconsistent with occupation law ' s proscription of
coercive transformation of a political system, as each involved the UN
Security Council as in effect the `occupying power'. "'
The US project of ` occupation as liberation ' in Iraq, however, presented
a completely different situation. Whereas the UN Security Council
had wholeheartedly supported, indeed created, those transitional UN
administrations, here its role was unclear and bitterly contested. Far
from authorising and legitimating the American transformative occupation, the relevant Security Council resolutions explicitly invoked occupatio bellica in designating the US and United Kingdom as occupying
powers and requiring them to comply ` fully with their obligations under
international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907'. 28 This not only resuscitated
occupatin bellica and its preservationist ethos from its long desuetude
26
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in international politics, but did so arguably to restrain the occupant's
authority unilaterally to transform Iraq's political order.29
The US was thus confronted with obstacles established by formal legal
rules on two fronts: on the one hand, transformative occupation was
prohibited under the classical rules of occupatio bellica; on the other,
it was permitted under modern international law but only according
to the norms and procedures specified in the UN Charter. On both
fronts instrumentalist arguments were needed to challenge the 'excessive
formalism' of the existing legal framework. Thus, for McGurk the preservationist principle of occupatio bellica was a `state-centered, nineteenthcentury conception of European warfare ... bear[ing] no relation to
modern military conflict or the contemporary thrust of public international law'.30 Similarly, for Scheffer the series of UN-sponsored
state-building projects since the 1990s showed that the scope of permissible action under occupation law should be expanded if the occupied
society requires `revolutionary changes in its economy (including a leap
into robust capitalism), rigorous implementation of international humanrights standards, a new constitution and judiciary, and a new political
structure (most likely consistent with principles of democracy)'. t As set
out in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, the basic
values of freedom, democracy and free enterprise - and importantly the
duty of protecting them -- are `right and true for every person, in every
society' . '" If this is the case, then the formal rules of occupatio bellica are
an obstacle to the right and must be amended or abandoned. Through this
chain of reasoning, the mediating tension of the double bind is broken:
the `objective of instituting - even imposing -- a democratic governance
regime where previously there was none is [thus] asserted as the value
relative to which positive legal rules should be adapted'. 3

In order to evaluate this argument, we need to explore the reasons
behind the formalism of the classical occupatio bellica. How can we
See, e.g,, Gregory H. Fox, 'The occupation of Iraq' (2(105) 36 Georgetown Journal of
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explain the dual nature of this concept which legitimates the specified
military aim of order preservation while also imposing constraints in
terms of order-constitutive authority enjoining the occupant's right to
effect fundamental constitutional change? The answer lies in the history
of the law of belligerent occupation as a mediating concept of territorial
and constitutional change in nineteenth-century European intersovereign warfare:" First, occupatio bellica applied only to wars between
European sovereigns. It did not apply in the case of colonial wars or
`police actions' against less civilised (that is, non-sovereign, non-European)
peoples and territories.' Thus, in specific cases, such as the British
occupation of Egypt or the Russian acquisition of Bulgaria, the `very
point of the war was to liberate a population from the antiquated and
despotic constitutional system of the Ottoman Empire, and it would
therefore be senseless to refrain from introducing a modern social and
legal order'. 36 Second, the specific functional characteristics of occupatio
bellica evolved in direct response to the French Revolution and ensuing
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars which threatened to destroy the legal
basis of the eighteenth-century European political order. These wars
` initiated constitutional change in place of conquest and ... attempted
to radically transform the nature of the state and the accepted bases
for territorial control'. 3'
The critical point here is that the formal law of occupatio bellica can
be seen to embody the two normative and epistemological components
of international legal argument discussed in Part I. In the first instance,
struggles over the political principles that define international order
cannot be mediated unless sovereign states recognise each other as
legal subjects with a mutual `duty of justification'. It is a common interest
of all states that existing sovereign authority should not be capable
of being overthrown either internally (by revolution) or externally (by
regime change). In the second instance, there is no universally prescriptive norm regarding the `constitutional question' of the permissible scope
and limits of internal political order. This argues for a degree of political
pluralism such that states remain free to develop domestically according
to their own circumstances.
Today, we interpret the refusal of the great powers to recognise
non-European `uncivilised' states as equal sovereigns as a moral failure
34
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vitiating the possibility of an inclusive international legal order. At the
same time, we recognise colonialism as an imperial attempt to impose a
Eurocentric standard of constitutional order on peoples and territories
lying outside of the jus publicurn Europaeum. In both instances, the
double bind of occupatio bellica was broken: in the case of the former,
as a one-sided, self-centered account lacking external orientation towards
the subjectivity of differently situated societies; in the case of the latter,
as a one-sided, other-centered account lacking sensitivity towards the
material values and ways of life of these societies.
A similar argumentative structure has shaped the positions taken
under international law to justify the transformative occupation of
Iraq. In the first instance, legal rules constraining the use of force and
limiting the rights and authority of an occupying power have been held
to be inapplicable in the case of Iraq. As an outlaw or rogue state ruled
by dictatorship and in violation of basic human rights, the very purpose
of regime change and occupation was to transform Iraq's political order
to bring it from the zone of politics into the zone of law of civilised
nations. This argument rests on an instrumentalist view of the identity of
the legal subject now unilaterally defined as the `liberal democratic state'.
By this move, the question of the rights and attributes of sovereignty is
never in fact reached as the legal status of the subject as a ` sovereign state'
is denied a priori.
In the second instance, to the extent occupatio bellica was held to
be applicable, its interpretation and application was determined solely by
the US as the occupying power. Thus, its substantive meaning was
expanded or amended to meet the needs and objectives of occupation.
Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) is a contradictory bundle of
formal and anti-formal provisions. On the one hand, it reaffirmed the
`sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq' and called for conditions to
be established for Iraqis to `freely determine their own political future';
on the other hand, it contemplated an extensive role to be played by the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) with only subsidiary roles
assigned for both the UN and an interim Iraqi administration." While
the US accepted its status as an occupying power in Iraq, it rejected
any political co-ordination with or oversight by the UN Security Council,
and retained absolute discretion as to the allocation of competenees and

"

See Charlesworth, 'Law after war', 239.
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functions in the transitional process.'3a The CPA had virtually plenary
governmental authority over the scope and terms of the remaking of
the Iraqi economic and political order, and it acted accordingly. A.°
While the formal notion of occupatio bellica was thus revived, the
US was able through a series of anti-formal moves to erase the basic
distinction between sovereign power and occupant authority. 4' The
double bind of occupatio bellica was thus broken into two one-sided
unities, From an anti-formal starting point, the US viewed the constraining function of the law of occupation as merely an unreal idealisation
reflecting its own objectivity and immediacy. The reasons for orderpreservation make sense only if one first assumes an order worth preserving, or that `bad ... occupants are occupying a good country' ''
Occupatio bellica may well apply in cases of belligerent occupation of
states objectively worthy of full sovereign recognition (for example,
democratic or similarly decent states), but not otherwise. Albeit onesided, this is a tacitly naturalistic, formal position. Conversely, from a
formal starting point, the US has viewed the legitimating function of
occupation law as merely an object of its own reflection and intentionality, or that `good occupants [are] occupying a bad country'. 43 The cause
is the political order and ideology of the US itself as the directive controlling image and the effect has been to project a particular subjective
conception of rationality onto the flat, substanceless surface of the legal
form of occupatio bellica. This is an anti-formal particular masquerading
as a universal.
III. The law of international human rights
The most striking reinterpretation of occupatio bellica's preservationist
ethos in the Iraqi occupation has been the suggested right of the occupier
to institute sweeping reforms to the political order in accordance with
fundamental human-rights norms. This assertion gets to the heart of
the paradox of `occupation as liberation'. The belligerent occupant's
39
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See generally Thomas 11, Grant, The security council and Iraq; An incremental practice'
(2003) 97 American Journal of International Law, 823-42, 853.
Bhuta, 'The antinomies of transforrnative occupation', 736-37.
Ibid, 737, See also Melissa Patterson, `Who's got the title? or, The remnants of debellatio
in post-invasion Iraq' (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal, 467-88, 474.
Adam Roberts, `Transformative military occupation: Applying the laws of war and
human rights' (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law, 580-622, 601.
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authority to create the new political order based on democracy and
human rights derives from force, from its prior achievement of military
control over a subject people. However, as Bhuta argues:
The occupant's ability to legitimate a new order in place of the old
depends on his capacity to engender among the occupied population
the belief, post facto, in the legitimacy of the occupant ' s 'naked power ' as a
precondition for the new basic norm to which the occupied is subjected. 44

The project of transformative occupation in this way turns on a precarious dialectic of subordination and legitimation: the military occupier
has `to subordinate before it can legitimate effectively, and the more it
tries to subordinate, the harder becomes the legitimation'. 1' Force alone,
though necessary, is not sufficient for the new order to become firmly
established. The subjects of occupation must cease their resistance and
either acquiesce or consent to the basic norm that defines the new order.
The desperate struggle for the occupier is to convince the occupied
population not to resist its military dictatorship on the promise of the
justice and legitimacy of the normative order being instantiated.
Having initially used sweeping anti-formal reasoning to reinterpret
occupatio bellica to justify transformative occupation, the occupier in order to succeed in legitimating the norm of the new order - now
switches to sweeping formalism. This is due to the danger that the
human-rights norms sought to be legitimated will be challenged by the
occupied population on anti-formalist grounds as ultimately subjective
and thus illegitimate. Such an argument may proceed as follows: human
rights, at least in the particular form they have assumed in international
law, have tainted Western liberal origins; the West embodies an alien
legal tradition premised on a stridently individualistic account of moral
personality; and the `universal' rights imposed by the occupier are thus
merely another form of Western imperialism - universalising the tenets
of a distinct tradition or `being illiberal about being liberal, forcing people
to be free'. 4c
Such arguments challenging the formalism and claims to universality
of international human-rights law raise difficult questions. Kennedy
points to the fact that human-rights ideas have a particular time and
a^.
Bhuta, `The antinomies of transformative occupation ' , 738.
'5 tl^icf., 724, 739.
4' H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable diversity in law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 245; Bhikhu Parekh, `The cultural particularity of liberal
democracy' in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West
(Cambridge:. Polity Press, 1993), 156-75.
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place of origin - ` Post-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western,
modern, capitalist' - and he argues that, to the extent the international
human-rights project is linked to liberal Western ideas about the relationship among law, politics, and economics, it is itself `part of the
problem'.'I'' Kennedy's critique has relevance to the transformative occupation of Iraq in at least two main areas. The first concerns the particular
form of secularism associated with Western liberalism and its relationship to religion.
If you thought secularism was part of what is bad about the modern
West, you might assert that human rights shares the secular spirit; that
as a sentimental vocabulary of devotion it actively displaces religion,
offering itself as a poor substitute. You might claim that the enforcement
of human rights, including religious rights, downgrades religion to a
matter of private and individual commitment, or otherwise advances
the secular project. 8
The second concerns the way that human rights positions itself as
an `emancipatory political project' that operates outside politics. The
implicit logic here is that:
emancipation means progress forward from the natural passions of politics
into the civilized reason of law. The urgent need to develop a more vigorous
human politics is sidelined . , . [and] [w]ork to develop law comes to be seen
as an emancipatory end in itself, leaving the human rights movement too
ready to articulate problems in political terms and solutions in legal terms.
Precisely the reverse would be more useful. °`'

These challenges to the universality of htunan rights apply with special
resonance in the case of Iraq, a non-Western society where Islam is
dominant and collective identities and affiliations are engrained in all
aspects of social and political life. Accordingly, we can appreciate how a
formal human-rights norm - for example, the right to freedom of
religion and belief - may be met with strong anti-formal claims to a
distinct Islamic conception of that norm. The argument may go that the
`universal' norm is underpinned by a particular comprehensive conception of the good (for example, a liberal account of moral personality and
personal autonomy) which generates an ultimately subjective and contested view of the relationship between the religious and the secular.
However, international human-rights law is unable to provide a
97
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universal answer regarding the truth of the good and thus show that all
other comprehensive beliefs are false. On this basis, human-rights norms
themselves must be intersubjectively contested as opposed to uncritically
accepted as a legal fait accompli beyond politics. The moral duty of
justification and the twin criteria of reciprocity and generality thus
support Kennedy's view that the human-rights dilemmas at issue in the
new Iraqi constitutional order are better articulated in legal terms and
their solutions in political terms than vice versa.
In response to arguments of this kind, the occupier will insist that the
norms that are to ground the new political order are not uniquely
Western but are universal values embedded in (formal) international
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). S° Indeed,
any groups or individuals resisting these norms are to be viewed as
enemies not just of America or the West, but of humanity." Conversely,
those groups and individuals recognising and consenting to these norms
are permitted to enter the community of civilised nations.
A complex and conflicted response to this dialectic can be seen
amongst the occupied population. For some, the imperial designs of
the occupier remain evident and resistance by force is urged until the
occupation is ended and national self-determination assured. But for
those engaging in the transitional political process, two general sensibilities emerge. The first is one of capitulation and consent: the constitutive
coercion of the occupier and the new political order should be accepted
precisely so as to accept the principles, laws and rules observed by
international society. This is a formal `universalist' sensibility. The second position, however, is more one of acquiescence: while it is necessary
to follow the rules of international law and be part of the community of
nations, the occupied population has its own unique identity, history,
culture and legal consciousness. Thus, having initially insisted on the
formalism of occupatio bellica (and other legal norms such as the prohibition on the use of force and self-determination), an anti-formal
argument is now made on the basis of a regional, national or religious
uniqueness and consciousness challenging the formalism and claims to
universality of international law. This is an anti-formal 'regionalist' or
`particularist' disposition.
See McGurk, `Revisiting the law of nation-building', 463.
s' Recall Carl Schmitt's statement that 'He who invokes humanity wants to cheat': Carl
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 54.
S°
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This universalist-regionalist dialectic is a familiar phenomenon in
the politics of international law. It is clearly seen, for example, in the
nineteenth-century debate between Alejandro Alvarez and Manoel
Alvaro de Souza SA Vianna over the role of international law in Latin
America (a debate itself spurred in response to US hegemony in the region).
For Vianna, the `problems common to the countries of Latin America
or the American continent did not and could not constitute a basis for
an autonomous or separate sphere of international law's ' This meant:
favoring the universality of international law, defined by a formalist legal
sensibility that was skeptical of regional integration, unconvinced by the
advantages of introducing regional fragmentation to the international
system, and had an agenda to pursue within professional circles as
opposed to regional political institutions.''

For Alvarez, however, appreciation of a unique ` Creole legal consciousness' led him to advocate a regional perspective in international law: a
`socially conscious and practical universal international law which took
into account regional differences'.'' 4 This meant `endorsing an antiformalist legal sensibility coupled with positivist political ideas and
integrationist aspirations'.Through the notion of Latin American
international law, particularist international lawyers sought to develop
an autonomous regional identity in international law while transposing
and nationalising a `modernist liberal agenda ' in domestic politics seeking to overcome colonial legacies. For these lawyers, the binarism of the
international legal double-bind thus operated in two directions: first, as
an external restraint in the form of a set of norms on the rights and duties
of states shaped by European particularisms; second, and in response, as
art internal enabling force legitimating the notion of a unique Creole
identity and consciousness. Conversely, universalist international lawyers rejected any notion of a Latin American international law and
sought full entry into the community of nations while supporting conservative policies at the domestic level. Here the double bind operated in
the reverse direction: first, as an external enabling force allowing the state
52
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to enter the sphere of law which `governs the relationship of civilized
peoples [and] does not admit distinctions, nor supremacy of any sort'; `'
and second, as an internal restraint on any emancipatory or progressive
domestic political movements. The former sensibility starts from the
anti-formal particular - from the situated or social self - and leads
towards the universal reaching a `concrete universal'. The latter sensibility starts from the formal universal -- from a set of abstract legal rules and leads towards the particular reaching an ` abstract particularism ' , "
This same dialectic structure has emerged among the various political
factions during the transitional political process in occupied Iraq. This
can most clearly be seen in the struggles over the relationship between
Islam (and religion more broadly) and the state under the new Iraqi
constitutional order. The story begins on 13 July 2003 with the appointment of a twenty-five-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which on
8 March 2004 signed a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).''s The
TAL was an exhortatory document with a distinctly liberal orientation.
The preamble reasserted the sovereignty of the people of Iraq, expressed
a commitment to international law, and stated that the TAL was being
established to `govern the affairs of Iraq during the transitional period
until a duly elected government, operating under a permanent and legitimate constitution achieving full democracy, shall come into being'.
Article 2 of the TAL divided the transitional period into two phases, the
first vesting authority in a sovereign interim government appointed by
the CPA in consultation with the UN; the second vesting authority in a
transitional government to be established following elections in January
2005.' 9 Significantly, Art. 4 declared that the `system of government in
Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralist'.' " On the
ss Carlos Calves Poielmica Calvo-Aleorta [The Calvo-Alcorta Polemic] (1883)
8 Nueva
Revista de Buenos Aires, 629, 631.
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Lorca, `international law in Latin America or Latin American international law?', 288-93.
5s
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (8 March 2004)
available at www.globalsecurity.org/wznd/library/news/iraq/2004/03/iraq-transitionaladminis tration-law_8mar2004.htm.
ss
For ai-Istrabadi, these two phases involved transfers of authority, not sovereignty: Feisal
Amin al-Istrabadi, `Reviving constitutionalism in Iraq: Key provisions of the
Transitional Administrative Law' (2005-2006) 50 New York Law School Law Review,
269-302, 274.
60
It is interesting to note that this wording closely tracks the 1992 Articles of Association of
the Iraqi National Congress (the group of Iraqi exiles who lobbied in the West for the
forced removal of the Saddam Hussein regime). See Noah Feldman and Roman
Martinez, ' Constitutional politics and text in the new Iraq: An experiment in Islamic
democracy' (2006) 75 Pordham Law Review 883-920, 889.
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contentious issue of the role of religion in the new Iraqi constitutional
order, however, Art. 7(A) stated that `Islam is the official religion of the
State and is to be considered a source of legislation'. The second part of this
sentence represented a decisive change in Iraq's constitutional history.
While it had long been established that Islam was the official state religion,
for the first time Islam was here expressly declared to be a ` source ' of law.
Already evident in the TAL were signs of what would become a major
site of disagreement. After the 2003 invasion and overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, the former exiled members of the Iraqi National Congress
(INC) and other members of a coalitio '' formed the leadership of the
IGC operating under the auspices of the CPA. Their vision of the constitutional foundations of the new Iraq was close to that of the occupying
powers and thus, for the Americans, the TAL represented a vindication
of their policy of regime change and democratic transformation. Indeed,
the Bush administration strongly supported the secular Iraqis among the
exile group who favoured a Kemalist-style constitution on the Turkish
model - one which rejected a public role for Islam and posited instead a
society of `science, knowledge, and civilization'. To the extent that Islam
was to have a larger role, the US lobbied negotiators involved in the
drafting process to ensure that this would not impinge upon religious
freedom, women's rights, or an independent Iraqi judiciary.'" On the
other hand, these policy objectives were also complicated by the participation of two other (non-exile) Iraqi groups in the constitution-drafting
project: Sunni Arabs and the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. "3 Sistani
insisted that the constitution be drafted by a democratically elected body
in order to avoid a constitution being imposed or overly influenced by
the US, and to ensure that the drafting body reflected Iraq's demographic
make-up (which is majority Shia). He then issued a religious mandate
ordering Iraqi men and women to vote.
National elections were held on 31 January 2005, and the first session
of a 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) replacing the
interim government was convened on 16 March. 2005. The TNA then
produced a draft constitution which barely won approval via referendum
at the end of 2005 in preparation for a permanent constitution, which in
6' This coalition was made up mainly of Kurdish factions (who advocated a secular political
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order fearing that Saddain's secular tyranny would be replaced by a Shia Islamic dictatorship), Shia opposition groups such as the Da'wa Party founded in the late 1950s and the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); and other secular and
independent political parties: see ibid., 888.
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February 2008 remains in the ratification process. There is no single text
of the draft Iraqi constitution. As of 15 August 2005, there were two
versions in existence: one, the Shia-driven TNA Constitutional
Committee draft; the other, the leadership-summit document drafted
by the Kurds and secular Shia and Sunnis. Article 2 of the 2005 constitution provides:
First:. Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a foundation source
of legislation:
(a) No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be
enacted.
(b) No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be enacted,
(c) No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in
this Constitution may be established,
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority
of the Iraqi people and protects the full religious rights to freedom of
religious belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis
and Mandean Sabeans.

While the decision to make Islam the official state religion was not
controversial, ei' what was intensely debated was the extent to which
Islam should be recognised as a source of law. Certain Shia Islamists,
particularly members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI), argued that Islam should be 'the basic or fundamental'
source of legislation. Other modifiers, such as 'principal' or 'amongst
other sources of legislation', also found support from the Shia religious
participants. The Kurdish representatives, however, advocated strongly
that Islam should be only one of several sources and proposed following Art. 7(A) of the TAI.: 'Islam ... is a source of legislation', The final
formulation of Islam as a 'foundation source' is thus a compromise
between the positions of the Shia and Kurdish groups. ' It appears to
leave the issue of hierarchy of sources of law open and ambiguous, with
Islam not necessarily superior to, but standing alongside, other fundamental sources of law (although no other fundamental sources are
expressly recognised)."
e`r Although a Shia proposal to describe Iraq as an 'Islamic state' was strongly opposed and
subsequently rejected, See Ashley S. Deeks and Matthew D. Burton, 'Iraq's constitution:
A drafting history' (2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal, 1-87, in 13.
es ibid., 3.

There remains confusion regarding the two Iraqi words of'asasi' and 'asas'. The former is
an adjective best translated as 'fundamental', whereas the latter is a noun best translated
as 'foundation', In the UN printing of the text, the drafters changed asasi to asas, hence
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Clauses (a) to (c) of Art. 2 are referred to as the `repugnancy' or 'noncontradiction' clauses. Shia negotiators supported the phrase ` established
provisions ' in clause (a) because it suggested a broader incorporation
of Islam into the constitution. Non-Shia negotiators objected, however,
because this connoted too wide-ranging a field of Islamic jurisprudence
against which Iraqi law could then be measured. Other secularists
further feared that the language could incorporate fatwas, or rulings
issued by religious scholars, as a type of legal ruling. From the other
side, Sunni negotiators opposed the phrase `established provisions',
and supported a less Islamic formulation, as they believed that the
`provisions' or `rulings' thus incorporated would derive only from
Shia Islam.
The phrases `principles of democracy' and `rights and basic freedoms
stipulated in this constitution' in clauses (b) and (c) were proposed
as an attempt to place a limit on the notion of Islam as a foundation
source of law. The language also made clear that the constitution is the
supreme law over ordinary federal or local statutes. Shia negotiators
opposed this language but could not win over the combined Kurdish
and secular negotiators who wanted non-contradiction clauses that
counter-balanced the `established provisions of Islam' language in clause
(a). The idea was that the presence of these parallel non-contradiction
clauses would operate to `equalise' Islam with the principles of democracy and basic human rights. This, in other words, was an attempt to
establish the constitutional framework for an `Islamic democracy' in the
new Iraq.
There was also significant political struggle in relation to the second
part of Art. 2. Article 7(A) of the TAI, had formerly provided that `This
law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and
guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of
religious belief and practice'. While earlier versions of the text provided
that the constitution `respects' the Islamic identity of the majority,
Shia negotiators fought hard to have `respect' replaced with `guarantees'.
This raises the complex legal question of what it means to `guarantee
the Islamic identity of the majority of Iraqis' and whether this provision could lead to measures that limit the religious freedom of
the current formulation of Islam as 'a foundation source'. Whether this is merely
symbolic or has juridical importance is an open question, See ibid., 10 (suggesting that
the 'latent ambiguity in this provision will prove to be a source of future sectarian
dissension').
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non-Muslims. 67 In addition, earlier attempts to create an exclusive list
of groups entitled to the religious rights at issue were finally superseded
on 26 August 2005 with language that added a specific, non-exclusive
list of ethno-religious groups to a generic reference `all individuals'."
Much like Art, 27 of the ICCPR, this provision thus proposes an ambiguous combination of individual and group rights. The Kurds argued that
it was important to include ` others' in the list of religious groups and that
the list should not be exclusive. Others objected on the ground that using
the phrase `and others' would marginalise or stigmatise all minority
groups in this `other' category. In the end, the words `and others' were
rejected, though all negotiators seemed to share the view that the list
remained non-exclusive.°
'These struggles over the normative structure of the new Iraqi constitutional order represent a collision between two competing sets of positions
and understandings of the basic norms defining political order. Under
basic precepts of liberal democratic theory, religion cannot be a formal
`source' of law; this is reserved to secular sources of constitutional and
domestic legal norms. Consistent with the Enlightenment premises of
individual freedom and personal autonomy, the rule of law is by definition
a secular project in which religion is transferred from the sphere of public
reason to the sphere of ` private' conscience and belief. For the occupiers,
such ideas define not just liberal constitutionalism but international
human-rights law itself: they are in this respect universal. For the INC
and the leadership of the IGC, this formal universalist sensibility is to be
embraced. Like Vianna and the universalist Latin American international
lawyers of the nineteenth century, this is the means for Iraq to re-enter the
sphere of the community of nations with the same rights and duties as the
other advanced states of the world. If Islam is to be a source of law, it must
be qualified by or at least stand equally with democratic principles and
basic rights and freedoms. Starting from an initial position of formal
universality, this is the form of ` abstract particularism ' finally reached.
See, c.g„ iflid., 17; citing Nina Shea and John F. Cullinan, 'Constitutional concerns',
National Review Online (29 August 2005); United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom, Iraq's Permanent Constitution: Analysis and recommendations
(Washington DC: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,
March 2006).
'° The freedom to choose one 's religion or belief is not specified in Art. 2. 0
*, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999
UNTS 171, Art. 18 (entered into force 23 March 1976),
69 Decks and Burton, 'Iraq's constitution', 17-18.
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However, for the other Iraqi factions these positions appear both antiformal and subjective. Like Alvarez and the particularist Latin American
lawyers, international human-rights law is seen to be shaped by, and
based on, Anglo-European precepts that must be contested in the quite
different normative context of Iraqi conceptions of constitutional order
and society. This means advancing a competing anti-formal legal sensibility based on a unique collective identity and legal consciousness. If for
the occupiers religion must find its place within a liberal democratic
order, then for the Iraqis democratic and human-rights norms must find
their place within an Islamic legal order. The ultimate basis of sovereign
authority is quite different. Starting from an initial position of the antiformal particular (as do the occupying powers themselves), this is the
form of ` concrete universal' that is finally reached. We can see this most
clearly in the struggle over the second part of Art. 2: it is not sufficient for
the constitution to `respect' the Islamic identity of the majority of the
Iraqi people, it must ` guarantee' it. This is the basis of the constitution
itself. Within that normative framework, the ` full rights' to freedom of
religion and belief of other groups and individuals must be protected.
Unlike liberal theories of rights, however, this does not mean a ` neutral '
state protecting a general right to `equal concern and respect'. Rather, it
suggests a conception of a ` socially conscious and practical universal
international law which ... [takes] into account regional differences'. ' °
Conclusion
The transformative occupation of Iraq provides a powerful illustration of
the two dominant critiques of formalism in international legal discourse
today: one rejecting formal sovereign equality on moral grounds because
it places democratic and rogue states on the same footing; the other
rejecting the formal rules of state sovereignty on the basis of a particular
ethical conception of the good. The discussion of occupatio bedlica in
Part II demonstrated how the former threatens international law ' s
underlying commitment to value pluralism and its denial of the legal
right of any one state to impose a single model of political order. The
discussion of human rights in Part III demonstrated how the latter
project of imperial democratisation has precipitated a collision between
two ultimately incommensurable positions: liberal anti-pluralism and
national self-determination. The ensuing struggle within Iraq over these
7°

See Obregoii, `Noted for dissent', 1015.
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competing bases of political legitimacy are the twin blades of the shears
that are threatening to cut to shreds the future of the Iraqi constitutional
order: one abstract but reaching for the particular; the other concrete
but reaching for the universal. The role of international law in this
fraught post-conflict dialectic has been shown to be at once ambiguous
and paradoxical: both facilitating the external instrumentalist project of
subordinating a resistant political order, while at the same time creating
a formal site necessary for the internal deliberation, contestation and
resistance to that project. While the justice of any position taken in the
struggle will remain fiercely contested, the one thing of which we can be
certain is the inevitability of transformation.

